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Destroying the Right Arm of Rebellion: Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation 
 
By Benjamin Pontz 
 
The Emancipation Proclamation was a gamble. If it were to 
succeed, it could cripple the economy of the South, decimating its war 
effort, drive the border states to accept compensated emancipation, 
ending slavery as an institution in the United States, and accelerate the 
end of the war, ensuring the endurance of the United States of America. 
If it were to fail, it could spur the border states to secede, galvanizing 
the South, render Abraham Lincoln a political pariah with two years 
remaining in his term, deflating the North, and encourage European 
states to broker a two-state solution in North America, sending the 
concept of the American republic to the history books as a failed 
experiment. Lincoln appreciated these high stakes as he methodically 
built the case for emancipation during the first two years of his 
presidency, drawing on his decades of experience in Illinois 
courthouses to develop what would be the most consequential legal 
argument he would ever have to make. That Lincoln had long thought 
slavery was a moral wrong was insufficient justification to decree its 
demise; he had to build a case that could withstand scrutiny from an 
adversarial federal court system and avoid a legal challenge until after 
the war, when he could pursue the permanent recourse available only 
through a constitutional amendment. 
 In building that legal case, Lincoln relied upon the notion of 
military necessity, arguing that the Constitution vested in the president 
war powers that enabled him to subdue an enemy using means that 
extend beyond the peacetime confines of Article II’s authority. Almost 
immediately upon issuing the proclamation, Lincoln faced a panoply 
of criticism from radical Republicans who thought he had not gone far 
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enough, congressmen who thought he had seized their (or their states’) 
rightful prerogatives, and legal scholars who thought the war powers 
he cited were totally fabricated and patently unconstitutional. In the 
years since, Lincoln has drawn criticism that the dense legalese in the 
proclamation’s text demonstrates a reluctance to actually free slaves, 
that he deliberately obfuscated the proclamation’s legal status to dodge 
legal scrutiny, and that he exercised an extraconstitutional power grab 
that amounted to the same tyranny Americans once fled in Britain. 
Each of these critiques has a rational basis, but each fails to appreciate 
the president’s ultimate obligation to preserve, protect, and defend the 
United States Constitution. The proclamation was Lincoln’s final move 
after his attempts to secure gradual, compensated emancipation failed 
and the Union’s prospects on the battlefield looked bleak. Therefore, 
having exhausted all other options, Lincoln developed the 
Emancipation Proclamation with meticulous attention to the 
Constitution so that he could continue his endeavor to secure slaves’ 
ultimate freedom upon winning the war and saving the Union. 
 The question of how to handle slaves that reached Union-held 
territory presented itself almost immediately at the outset of the war. 
On May 23, 1861, three slaves who were property of Confederate 
Colonel Charles Mallory presented themselves to Union troops at 
Fortress Monroe. Major General Benjamin Butler, a lawyer, reasoned 
that these slaves were effectively Confederate property being used in 
the war effort, and, according to international law, could be considered 
“contraband” and seized accordingly. That is exactly what Butler did, 
and the War Department approved of his action, which simultaneously 
deprived the enemy of labor and provided that labor to the Union 
Army. That August, Congress approved of Butler’s policy by passing 
the Confiscation Act of 1861, which Lincoln, fearful of its 
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constitutional ramifications as well as its potential effect on the border 
states, reluctantly signed.1 
 Later that month, Maj. Gen. John Fremont declared martial law 
in St. Louis and then the entire state of Missouri amid Confederate rebel 
activity that created a “desperate military and political situation.” In his 
declaration, he claimed the right to confiscate all property – including 
slaves – of anyone who had taken the rebels’ side in the war. The 
proclamation sparked an outcry in both the Unionist and southern 
rights press from Missouri to Kentucky, and, on September 11, Lincoln 
ordered Fremont to change the act to comply with the Confiscation Act 
“in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves.” 
Lincoln later fired Fremont, but, in a letter to Senator Orville 
Browning, said military emancipation could potentially be authorized 
by Congress and that Fremont could even have seized slaves 
temporarily but lacked the power to do so permanently by military 
proclamation. That was a job for lawmakers, not the military.2 
 Further south, on May 9, 1862, Maj. Gen. David Hunter issued 
General Order 11, which declared slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Florida – states in rebellion who had thus opened themselves to 
martial law as militarily necessary – forever free. He also sought to 
enlist black men into the Union Army. Similar to his response in 
Missouri, Lincoln immediately recognized the political and legal 
ramifications of such an order, and he rescinded it on May 19. Perhaps 
                                                          
1 Benjamin Butler, Butler’s Book (Boston, 1892), 256-257; Butler to Lt. Gen. 
Winfield Scott, May 24-27, 1861, O.R., ser. 2, vol. 1, 752-754; Simon Cameron 
to Butler, May 30, 1861, O.R., ser. 2, vol. 1, 754-755; “An Act Used to 
Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes,” Aug. 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 
319 (1863). 
2 William Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 98-102; Proclamation of 
Fremont, Aug. 30, 1861, O.R., ser. 1, vol. 1, 466-467; Lincoln to Fremont, Sep. 
11, 1861, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, (Roy Basler, ed. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press), 4: 517-518; Lincoln to 
Browning, Sep. 22, 1861, C.W., vol. 4, 531-532. 
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foreshadowing his own actions to come, he added that only the 
president could determine such an act a military necessity: “[Such 
power] I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving 
to the decision of commanders in the field.” Even so, Union generals 
from Missouri all the way to the Gulf sought to impress upon Lincoln 
the military necessity of emancipation throughout the early part of 
1862. Lincoln recognized, however, that a piecemeal approach to 
emancipation driven by commanders in the field would neither be 
politically nor legally feasible and that the Confiscation Act, too, was 
legally tenuous. As such, he focused on building support in the political 
arena for a more stable solution.3  
 From the beginning, it was clear that Lincoln would endeavor 
to act within the bounds of the law in how he managed the war, and his 
policy towards slaves was no exception. Although Lincoln was 
personally opposed to slavery, a subject he had discussed at length 
during the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates and would note again in a 
famous letter to Horace Greeley in August 1862 stating his “oft-
expressed personal wish that all men every where [sic] could be free,” 
personal misgivings could not justify a national policy of blanket 
emancipation. Particularly (though not exclusively) in the border states, 
Lincoln instead promulgated gradual, compensated emancipation, 
which, in his estimation, was cheaper than ongoing execution of the 
war, was clearly constitutional, and would cripple an insurrection 
predicated on winning the allegiance of border states to protect slavery. 
While legislators such as John Crittenden of Kentucky, who argued that 
slavery was a state institution, resented federal meddling in slavery, 
                                                          
3 Proclamation by Abraham Lincoln, May 19, 1862, Presidential Proclamations, 
Series 23, Record Group 11, National Archives; Kristopher Teters, Practical 
Liberators: Union Officers in the Western Theater during the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 2018), 36-41; David 
Livingstone, “The Emancipation Proclamation, the Declaration of 
Independence, and the Presidency: Lincoln’s Model of Statesmanship,” 
Perspectives on Political Science 28 (1999): 206-207. 
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many expressed openness to the proposal provided the compensation 
was sufficient. Lincoln had high hopes throughout late 1861 and early 
1862 that his scheme would find supporters. Such hope soon 
evaporated. With the passage of a bill ending slavery in Washington 
D.C. in April, Hunter’s emancipation endeavor in May, and the passage 
of the Confiscation Act of 1862, which opened the door to federal 
emancipation, in July, border state opposition hardened. After Lincoln 
had convened a delegation of border state congressmen to make a final 
appeal, they replied in a majority report on July 13, “Our people … will 
not consider the proposition in its present impalpable form.” 
Disapproval from border state congressmen along with a growing 
sense of military urgency after Lincoln reviewed the Army of the 
Potomac at Harrison’s Landing spurred him to begin work on a more 
sweeping solution.4 
 That approach became known as the Emancipation 
Proclamation. His sense of military exigency heightened after General 
George McClellan had used the word “capitulate” in connection to the 
Army of the Potomac’s fate absent more reinforcements, Lincoln set to 
work on a first draft of the proclamation. “I felt that we had reached the 
end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that 
we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose 
the game,” Lincoln later wrote of his decision to begin formulating a 
new plan for emancipation. In an 1899 McClure’s Magazine article, 
                                                          
4 Lincoln, Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, in The Emancipation 
Proclamation: A Brief History with Documents, Michael Vorenberg, ed. 
(Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 58; Harris, Lincoln and the Border States, 
161-162, 179-182; Don Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 
1850s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 75-79; Border State 
Congressmen to Lincoln, Jul. 14, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, Library of 
Congress; Brian Danoff, “Lincoln and the ‘Necessity’ of Tolerating Slavery 
Before the Civil War,” Review of Politics 77 (2015): 69; Speech of John J. 
Crittenden, of Kentucky, on emancipation, Mar. 11, 1862, in Slavery Source 
Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press, 1977), 
microfiche. 
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Ida Tarbell observed, “Lincoln never came to a point in his public 
career where he did not have a card in reserve, and he never lacked the 
courage to play it if he was forced to.” His military on the ropes and 
talking of surrender, Lincoln had no choice but to move to the final 
card in his hand. As William Harris wrote,  
The huge and demoralizing losses suffered by General McClellan 
in the ill-fated June 1862 Peninsula campaign to take Richmond 
brought intense pressure from Republicans for the president to take 
more vigorous measures against the rebels. Lincoln’s view of 
southern resistance also hardened, which increased his 
determination to find legal authority to move against slavery in the 
insurrectionary states. 
 
On July 13, 1862, he discussed the potential proclamation with 
Secretary of State William Seward and Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, 
emphasizing the notion of military necessity as the legal justification 
for such an edict. Having signed – again with reluctance – the 
Confiscation Act of 1862 on July 17, Lincoln framed his draft 
Emancipation Proclamation pursuant to section six of that act, which 
required the president to issue a proclamation enabling seizure of rebel 
property. He presented the draft to his cabinet on July 22. It found 
general, though not unanimous, agreement. Seward advised waiting 
until a military victory so the proclamation would not look desperate, 
and Lincoln agreed.5  
                                                          
5 William Klingman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation, 1861-
1865 (New York: Viking, 2001), 139-140, 157-158; Ida Tarbell, “Lincoln and 
the Emancipation Proclamation,” McClure’s Magazine 12 (1899): 514; Harris, 
Lincoln and the Border States, 189; Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, ed. John Torrey Morse (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), vol. 1, 70; “An Act to suppress Insurrection, to 
punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, 
and for other Purposes,” U.S., Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of 
the United States of America, vol. 12 (Boston, 1863), 589-592; Preliminary 
Draft of Emancipation Proclamation, Jul. 22, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, 
Library of Congress. 
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Lincoln found that victory, such as it was, in the Battle of 
Antietam on September 17. On September 22, Lincoln issued the 
preliminary version of the Emancipation Proclamation. Notably, this 
was just weeks before the midterm elections. Lincoln had long taken 
what Fehrenbacher has called an “extreme” view that the people – 
through their voice at the ballot box – are the ultimate arbiters of what 
is constitutional. If the people’s initial utterance was any indication, 
they had concerns. Republicans lost 31 seats in the House as well as 
several important governorships in the fall of 1862. Although Lincoln 
never admitted this was a result of the preliminary proclamation – and, 
certainly, other factors such as rising inflation, high taxes, imposition 
of conscription, and the general malaise of a long war likely played a 
role – the people’s initial feedback was hardly resounding support. 
When Congress reconvened in December, Lincoln made a final 
attempt to rekindle gradual, compensated emancipation in his annual 
address, but the proposal was defeated by both radicals on the left and 
pro-slavery factions on the right. Lincoln, therefore, spent the week 
after Christmas putting the finishing touches on his proclamation, 
carefully exempting Union-held territories in the South to ensure his 
argument of military necessity remained sound despite protest from 
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase that doing so would create 
administrative nightmares. Lincoln was careful not to overstep his 
constitutional bounds, and the exemptions stood. He signed the 
proclamation on January 1, 1863.6 
In the constitutional debate that surrounded the issue of 
emancipation, Lincoln proved to be his own best advocate. 
                                                          
6 Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Sep. 22, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, 
Library of Congress; Don Fehrenbacher, “Lincoln and the Constitution,” in The 
Public and Private Lincoln, Cullom Davis et al., eds. (Carbondale, Illinois: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 134; Klingman, Lincoln and the Road 
to Emancipation, 205-207, 228-229; Harris, Lincoln and the Border States, 204-
205; Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, Library of 
Congress. 
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Fundamentally, Lincoln’s argument rested on the idea that the president 
had inherent war powers that he could exercise when militarily necessary 
on issues beyond the reach of Congress or the peacetime executive 
power. Emancipation was one such issue. Crucially, however, it was not 
the only one. As Fehrenbacher noted, 
[Lincoln] responded to the attack on Fort Sumter by enlarging the 
army, proclaiming a blockade of Southern ports, suspending the writ 
of habeas corpus in certain areas, authorizing arbitrary arrests and 
imprisonments on a large scale, and spending public funds without 
legal warrant. He never yielded the initiative seized at this time. 
 
That emancipation was another area that required executive initiative 
was not a unanimous legal opinion; while even most Radical 
Republicans conceded that ending slavery was beyond the scope of the 
legislative power, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, for one, 
argued in 1864 that Congress had always had the power to regulate 
slavery by simple statute as “commerce among the states.” For Lincoln, 
however, military necessity put this issue squarely within the sphere of a 
wartime executive power. Since the outset of the war, many Union 
officers had gradually come to see the fruits of emancipating slaves 
within enemy territory as militarily advantageous and had urged Lincoln 
to consider a broader regime to assist them in the field. That was the aim 
of this wartime emancipation.7 
 Relying on the notion that Article II’s commander-in-chief 
clause necessarily vested the president with war powers with which to 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, Lincoln felt he had the 
authority to subdue the rebellion in states that had removed themselves 
from the civil law regime that had put slavery in the states beyond the 
reach of the federal government. In a public letter to James Conkling, 
                                                          
7 Fehrenbacher, “Lincoln and the Constitution,” 127; “Universal Emancipation 
Without Compensation,” Speech by Charles Sumner, Apr. 8, 1864, in Slavery 
Source Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press, 
1977), microfiche; Teters, Practical Liberators, 41. 
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Lincoln wrote, “I think the constitution invests its commander-in-chief, 
with the law of war, in time of war. … Is there--has there ever been--any 
question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, 
may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it, 
helps us, or hurts the enemy?” During wartime, this assertion put the 
proclamation beyond the reach of the federal courts, but Lincoln 
acknowledged that war powers end when war ends. As such, he freely 
admitted that the courts would rule on the proclamation after the war and 
that such a ruling may not be favorable to the permanence of 
emancipation particularly given the presence atop the Supreme Court of 
Roger Taney, author of the Dred Scott opinion. In July 1863, Lincoln 
said in a letter to Stephen Hurlbut, “I think it is valid in law, and will be 
so held by the courts.” Two months later, Congressman-Elect Green 
Clay Smith of Kentucky asked Lincoln to affirm the right of “repentant 
rebels” in the border states to redress grievances arising from the 
Emancipation Proclamation in civil courts. Lincoln replied that he was 
“perfectly willing” to allow the Courts to have their say at the appropriate 
time and pledged to “abide by judicial decisions when made.” Cognizant 
that the courts likely would not uphold a proclamation rooted in an 
argument of military necessity after the war, Lincoln acknowledged the 
need for a constitutional amendment to permanently end slavery. The 
13th Amendment would come to be what Lincoln called a “king’s cure 
for all evils.”8 
 In the years since Lincoln made his constitutional case for 
emancipation, some scholars have concluded either that he was not 
confident in the case he had made and sought an opportunity to escape 
the situation or that he deliberately obfuscated the constitutional 
arguments to sow confusion. Neither argument seems to fully hit the 
mark. The first, proffered by Barry Schwartz, is predicated on the notion 
                                                          
8 Lincoln to Conkling, Aug. 26, 1863, C.W. vol. 6, 407-409; Lincoln to Hurlbut, 
Jul. 31, 1863, C.W. vol. 6, 359; “An Amnesty Suggested,” New York Times, Sep. 
10, 1863, 5; Response to a Serenade, Feb. 1, 1865, C.W. vol. 8, 255. 
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that, were the Confederacy to agree to rejoin the Union in exchange for 
rescinding the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln would have readily 
acquiesced. “Lincoln probably feigned his uncertainty over the postwar 
status of the proclamation,” Schwartz writes. “The prospect for an 
abolition amendment aside, he knew the restoration of the prewar 
Constitution was certain when the war ended.” Schwartz contends that 
Lincoln vacillated on the end of emancipation; what appears more likely 
is that Lincoln vacillated, or, more accurately, evolved, on the means to 
end slavery. Harold Holzer’s thinking is in a similar vein to Schwartz’s, 
though Holzer contends Lincoln was deliberately inconsistent and 
ambiguous in his framing of emancipation. In Holzer’s view, the 
“microscopic precision” with which the proclamation was crafted to 
avoid legal challenges had an ulterior motive: to avoid inflaming 
passions that would cause political problems and give Lincoln an 
opportunity to “spin” the proclamation in the media. It is certainly the 
case that Lincoln’s legal argument for emancipation evolved from his 
early plans for compensated gradualism to the ultimate proclamation, but 
that is more evident of the changing conditions on the ground and an 
earnest desire to comply with the Constitution than any cold-footed 
apprehension or nefarious manipulation. In sum, Lincoln’s constitutional 
argument for the proclamation he issued was tightly rooted in his power 
as commander-in-chief.9 
 Other constitutional arguments in support of the Emancipation 
Proclamation meandered onto more tenuous legal ground. In a pamphlet 
responding to charges that Lincoln’s assertion of war powers was 
antithetical to constitutional principles, Grosvenor Lowrey responded 
that, in subduing “rebellious communities,” the president can free slaves, 
but he conceded that such power is extraconstitutional. “The military 
                                                          
9 Barry Schwartz, “The Emancipation Proclamation: Lincoln’s Many Second 
Thoughts,” Society 52 (2015): 594; Harold Holzer, Emancipating Lincoln: The 
Proclamation in Text, Context, and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), 93-94. 
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power suspends, but never destroys the law. Inter arma silent [in the 
midst of war, the law is silent],” he wrote. Others contended that exacting 
vengeance justified emancipation. Before a raucous crowd at Boston’s 
Emancipation League in 1861, former Massachusetts Governor and 
future congressman George Boutwell argued that the president should 
pursue military emancipation as a matter of military necessity, but that, 
regardless, the South had ceded its right to constitutional protection. 
“The rebels have no right to complain,” he said, to thunderous applause. 
Such a punitive argument could, however, have been used to construe 
the Emancipation Proclamation as a bill of attainder, which the 
Constitution expressly forbids. While William Whiting, the War 
Department’s solicitor, had issued a pamphlet arguing that nothing in the 
Emancipation Proclamation could be so construed because bills of 
attainder had been punishable only by death in Britain, not seizure of 
property, that argument was certainly weaker than the notion that slaves 
could be freed since they were helping the Confederacy’s war effort.10 
 A handful of arguments did buttress Lincoln’s claim that 
emancipation was a military necessity that the commander-in-chief 
power justified. Sumner, an ardent abolitionist, had long been motivated 
by the moral arguments against slavery, but he also trumpeted the 
practical advantages of emancipation in a speech at Boston’s Faneuil 
Hall in October 1862, arguing that freed slaves could enlist in the Union 
Army. Perhaps a rhetorical flourish, but one he repeated again in 
                                                          
10 Grosvenor Lowrey, The Commander-in-Chief: A Defence upon Legal 
Grounds of the Proclamation of Emancipation, (New York, 1863), quoted in 
Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865, Frank Feidel, ed. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967); “Emancipation: Its Justice, Expediency and 
Necessity, As the Means of Securing a Speedy and Permanent Peace,” speech by 
George Boutwell, Dec. 16, 1861, in Slavery Source Material and Critical 
Literature (Louisville: Lost Cause Press, 1977), microfiche; Henry Chambers, 
“Lincoln, the Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power,” Maryland 
Law Review 73 (2013): 125-126; William Whiting, The War Powers of the 
President and the Legislative Powers of Congress in Relation to Rebellion, 
Treason, and Slavery (Boston: Rand & Avery, 1873), 92.  
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February 1863 and April 1864, Sumner added, “There is no blow which 
the President can strike, there is nothing he can do against the rebellion, 
which is not constitutional. Only inaction can be unconstitutional.” 
Sumner’s fellow Bay Stater Edward Everett incorporated international 
law in his defense of the Emancipation Proclamation, writing, “Who can 
suppose it is the duty of the United States to continue to recognize 
[slavery]” when states are in rebellion since the institution finds no basis 
in the law of nations nor in natural law. The potential for an international 
intervention in the Civil War was something Lincoln considered as he 
weighed issuing the proclamation, but he ultimately thought the 
proclamation would not have a substantial effect either way. Indeed, 
other events in Europe did more to dissuade a brokered peace settlement 
than the Emancipation Proclamation. Perhaps the most full-throated 
defense of the proclamation aside from Lincoln came in Whiting’s 
aforementioned pamphlet. Whiting contended that the Constitution is 
designed to create a perpetual republic and that, therefore, it must grant 
the president sufficient war powers to preserve that republic regardless 
of whether the war has been formally declared (which this one had not 
so as to avoid legitimizing southern secession). Significantly, Whiting 
quoted the 1827 court decision Martin v. Mott, which concluded that “the 
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively 
to the President, and that this decision is conclusive upon all other 
persons.” While that case dealt specifically with the president’s power to 
call up militias to suppress rebellion, it lent credence to Lincoln’s 
contention that the Constitution had vested certain war powers in the 
president to use when militarily necessary. Overall, arguments in support 
of the proclamation were often more spirited than Lincoln’s, but they 
were less tight, a fact on which the proclamation’s opponents seized.11 
                                                          
11 Charles Sumner, Emancipation! Its Policy and Necessity as a War Measure 
for Suppression of the Rebellion, Oct. 6, 1862, (Boston, 1862); “Immediate 
Emancipation as a War Measure!” Speech by Charles Sumner, Feb. 12, 1863, in 
Slavery Source Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost 
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 Among the sharpest critics of the Emancipation Proclamation 
was Harvard Law Professor Joel Parker. At the core of Parker’s 
objection lay the notion of ostensibly unlimited war powers, which the 
president could use to defend any action in the name of military 
necessity. Emancipation was not, in Parker’s view, a legitimate response 
to a military exigency, but an executive power grab that threatened the 
constitutional order. He wrote, 
There is nothing in the colonial or revolutionary history, or in the 
history of the adoption of the State constitutions, or in the adoption 
of the Constitution of the United States, which can for a moment 
sustain the assumption of any such war powers, either by Congress 
or by the President. And there is nothing material to the suppression 
of the rebellion, which may not be accomplished without the 
assumption of such a construction of the Constitution. 
 
After excoriating Whiting for promulgating “bad law, and, if possible, 
worse logic,” Parker concluded that the Constitution granted sufficient 
power to the executive and legislative branches to suppress a rebellion: 
laws against conspiracy and sedition, for example, are constitutional; 
presidential proclamations seizing property without any semblance of 
due process, however, are not.12 
 Notably, two years earlier, Parker had defended the Lincoln 
administration’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and condemned 
Taney’s dictum in Ex parte Merryman, which said that the president had 
no constitutional authority to suspend the writ. Parker acknowledged 
that, in times of war, “The military law must be held to supersede the 
                                                          
Cause Press, 1977), microfiche; “Universal Emancipation Without 
Compensation,” Speech by Charles Sumner, Apr. 8, 1864, in Slavery Source 
Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press, 1977), 
microfiche; “Everett on Emancipation,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 27, 1864, 2; Don 
Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the Civil War, 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 220; Whiting, War Powers, 66-67; Martin v. 
Mott, 25 U.S. [12 Wheaton] 19 (1827). 
12 Joel Parker, The War Powers of Congress, and of the President, (Cambridge: 
H.O. Houghton, 1863), 6, 32, 9-10, 57-59. 
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civil law in that exigency, and this in consistency with, and not in 
antagonism to, the Constitution.” Parker argued that the Constitution 
provides a paramount right for the federal government to suppress 
insurrection, but he refused to follow that argument to the logical end 
that someone had to determine what was legitimate to operationalize that 
right. Whiting contended that it was the president who could make such 
a determination, but Parker loathed this argument because, as Phillip 
Paludan observed, it “expanded power, diminished liberty, and glorified 
both actions as justified by the Constitution.” Although Parker supported 
the war, he loathed the dramatic expansions of power that came in its 
wake. In his view, the war’s goal should have been simply to save the 
Union in the name of stability and order. Lincoln’s assertion of executive 
power, though ostensibly towards the same end of saving the Union, 
threatened that stability and order.13 
 Former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis, who resigned 
from the Court after he dissented from the Dred Scott decision, was more 
charitable to Lincoln’s attempt to act within the bounds of the 
Constitution, but, like Parker, Curtis thought the Emancipation 
Proclamation was executive overreach. While Curtis acknowledged that 
there may be exceptional cases that threaten public safety in which the 
president may “justly look for indemnity” beyond the scope of the 
enumerated powers, public safety was not threatened in this matter. As 
such, the president was confined to his executive powers, which restrict 
him to executing – not making, suspending, or altering – the laws. He 
rejected the notion of implied powers justifying disregard for the limits 
expressed in the Constitution.  He wrote, 
It must be obvious … that if the President of the United States has an 
implied constitutional right, as commander-in-chief of the army and 
                                                          
13 Ex parte Merryman 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); Parker, Habeas 
Corpus and Martial Law, (Cambridge: Welch, Bigelow, and Company, 1861), 22; 
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navy in time of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the 
Constitution … because, in his judgment, he may thereby ‘best 
subdue the enemy,’ he has the same right, for the same reason, to 
disregard each and every provision of the constitution, and to 
exercise all power, needful, in his opinion, to enable him ‘best to 
subdue the enemy.’ 
 
In other words, Lincoln’s argument has no limiting principle to constrain 
the president. The president’s commander-in-chief power, Curtis 
concluded, must be exercised in subordination to the laws of the country, 
from which alone he derives his authority.14 
 Members of Congress, too, argued that emancipation 
transcended the president’s (or Congress’s) constitutional power. 
Discussing a joint resolution that pledged support for gradual abolition 
in March 1862, Crittenden argued that the Constitution contained a 
natural right to self-preservation, but not to use any means in its pursuit. 
Wholesale abolition, he argued, would go too far in infringing upon the 
rights of states. In June, Samuel Cox, an Ohio Democrat, contended that 
emancipation, particularly by executive fiat, violated the Constitution’s 
ban on bills of attainder, its definition of treason (which is confined to 
“levying war” against the United States), the takings clause, separation 
of powers, and the right to a trial by jury. Finally, in December 1862, as 
it was becoming clear Lincoln intended to follow through and issue the 
proclamation, Unionist Congressman John Crisfield of Maryland argued 
that allowing such an assertion of war power would be a slippery slope. 
“Once admitted as a power belonging to this government,” he 
argued, “[necessity] swallows up all other powers, and resolves 
everything into the mere discretion of the individual who may 
happen to wield its mighty energies. This is the definition of 
                                                          
14 Benjamin Curtis, Executive Power, (Cambridge, 1862), quoted in Union 
Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865, Frank Feidel, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 454-455, 461, 467. 
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despotism.” Avoiding despotism undergirded most of the arguments 
against the Emancipation Proclamation.15 
 Both Parker and Curtis had argued that the legislative branch had 
sufficient power to suppress the rebellion at hand, which obviated the 
need for any exercise of emergency powers anyway. In the years 
preceding the Emancipation Proclamation, Congress had moved against 
slavery only incrementally. Ignoring Taney’s decision in Dred Scott 
under the premise that, because he had ultimately dismissed the case for 
lack of standing, he could not make a substantive ruling on its merits, 
Congress moved a legislative agenda that paved the way for blacks to 
serve in militias, forbade military participation in recapture of fugitive 
slaves, and banned slavery in federal territories and Washington D.C. 
Perhaps most notably, Congress had also passed the Second 
Confiscation Act. However, those measures largely exhausted its legal 
authority to counteract slavery except for the possibility of appropriating 
funds to support compensated emancipation in the border states, 
something those states had rejected. Parker had argued that Congress 
could have moved against sedition and conspiracy, but neither would 
have materially affected the economy or politics of the South. As such, 
it is not clear what options Congress had that would have been remotely 
as effectual as the Emancipation Proclamation.16 
                                                          
15 Speech of John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, on emancipation, Mar. 11, 1862, 
in Slavery Source Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost 
Cause Press, 1977), microfiche; “Emancipation and its results--is Ohio to be 
Africanized?” Speech of Samuel S. Cox, Jun. 6, 1862, in Slavery Source 
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16 Curtis, Executive Power, 469; Parker, The War Powers of Congress, and of 
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 Congress’s inability to act further supports to Lincoln’s 
argument of military exigencies compelling the commander-in-chief to 
act using war powers. During the war, the courts largely yielded to 
Lincoln’s assertions of those war powers. In United States v. Cashiel 
(1863), which dealt with whether a civilian could be court martialed, the 
District Court of Maryland ruled only on a procedural issue pertaining to 
double jeopardy rather than weighing in on the extent of the federal 
government’s war powers, which it acknowledged are “a problem of no 
easy solution, but one which is now engaging the attention and careful 
consideration of the statesmen and jurists of the land.” The court thus 
constrained itself from ruling on a federal war power assertion. On two 
occasions, federal courts upheld the Lincoln administration’s assertion 
of war powers. In United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine 
Packages (1862), the Eastern District Court of Missouri cited the 
Supreme Court’s 1849 ruling in Luther v. Borden as it acknowledged the 
right of the political branches – Congress and the president – to 
determine the nation’s state of peace or war and held that citizens and 
civil courts are bound by that decision. In Elgee’s Adm’r v. Lovell (1865), 
the Circuit Court of Missouri denied the right of a Louisianan to reclaim 
cotton seized under the Confiscation Act of 1862 since, according to the 
law of nations, “in time of war, an enemy cannot sue in the courts of the 
country with which his nation is belligerent … all persons, citizens or 
subjects of the nations thus at war, are themselves enemies each to the 
other.”17 
 The only two unfavorable rulings in federal court pertaining 
specifically to presidential assertions of war powers came in Ex parte 
Merryman (1861) and Ex parte Benedict (1862). In the former, Chief 
Justice Roger Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus and ordered General 
                                                          
17 United States v. Cashiel, 25 F. Cas. 318, 321 (D. Md. 1863); United States v. 
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George Cadwalader to bring John Merryman, whom the Army had 
arrested, before the court to hear the charges against him. Cadwalader 
declined on the grounds that the Army had suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus. In the ensuing legal opinion, Taney concluded that the 
Constitution vests the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus only 
in Congress and that neither the president nor the military could do so, 
but the Lincoln administration declined to comply with Taney’s order. 
The circumstances in Ex parte Benedict, a case arising from the Northern 
District of New York, were similar, and the judge cited Taney’s ruling 
to affirm that the president could not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
However, the judge declined to hold the federal marshal in contempt for 
disobeying the writ, perhaps a tacit acquiescence to the executive 
branch’s prerogatives. Fehrenbacher observed that most legal scholars 
would have agreed with Taney’s analysis, but that, in the intervening 
years, few have faulted Lincoln for not complying with the writ. “[This] 
does not mean that Lincoln condemned the institution of judicial 
review,” Fehrenbacher wrote. “He did, however, reject the doctrine of 
judicial supremacy.” In Lincoln’s eyes, the court did not have a 
monopoly on constitutional interpretation, a job that ultimately rested 
with the people.18 
 Ultimately, the Prize Cases (1863) had established that 
conditions on the ground establish the presence of a war regardless of 
any formal declaration and that, when those conditions were present, the 
president “was bound to meet [belligerent force] in the shape it presented 
itself,” using his powers as commander-in-chief to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution of the United States. In confronting the issue of 
emancipation, Lincoln was measured and methodical as he sought first 
to convince the border states to accept gradual, compensated 
emancipation, then approved General Butler’s contraband policy, then, 
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however grudgingly, signed the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, 
and finally concluded that the conditions on the ground presented 
themselves in such a shape that required the Emancipation Proclamation. 
He had rejected the idea of emancipation in 1861, saying at the time, 
“No, we must wait until every other means has been exhausted. This 
thunderbolt will keep.” By July 1862, however, he determined the time 
had come, and he made a good faith constitutional case that the president 
had the power as commander-in-chief to subdue his enemy through 
emancipation, which would, in the words of his John Nicolay, “destroy 
the right arm of the rebellion.”19 
 Whether the courts would have upheld the Emancipation 
Proclamation after the war is a hypothetical whose realization the 13th 
Amendment obviated. Lincoln had signaled previously that he was 
unsure, but, given that he justified the proclamation using war powers, it 
seems unlikely such powers would endure when the war did not, which 
explained Lincoln’s sense of urgency as he pushed Congress to pass a 
constitutional amendment outlawing slavery. Nevertheless, Lincoln 
appeared to have the fate of the proclamation on his mind when he 
appointed his former Treasury Secretary Chase as the Supreme Court’s 
Chief Justice upon Taney’s death in October 1864. “We want a man who 
will sustain the Legal Tender Act and the Proclamation of 
Emancipation,” Lincoln told George Boutwell. “We cannot ask a 
candidate what he would do; and if we did and he should answer, we 
should only despise him for it.” Lincoln thus implied that Chase’s views 
on the subject were known and he would likely uphold the proclamation 
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were it to reach the court prior to a constitutional amendment’s 
ratification.20 
Even if the court had struck down the proclamation after the war, 
it seems that Lincoln would not have regretted issuing it because, in his 
view, even if it was beyond the law’s enumerated power, the Union must 
endure. “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted,” he asked, “and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Such a line of 
thinking has led some contemporary scholars to wonder whether, even 
if the Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional, we should care. 
Law professor Sanford Levinson delivered an address in 2001 asking 
that very question. “Who cares,” he argued, “reflects an important 
intellectual reality with regard to assessment of political actions: When 
all is said and done, we place far greater emphasis on whether we 
substantively like the outcomes, than on their legal pedigree.” Certainly, 
though, Lincoln cared. His adversaries did too. In fact, Curtis was so 
offended by a “leading and influential” Republican newspaper’s 
declaration that “nobody cares” whether the proclamation is 
constitutional that he devoted several pages of his pamphlet to defending 
the rule of law and defended Lincoln, whom Curtis believed cared “that 
he and all other public servants should obey the Constitution.” It is also 
striking that Lincoln and Parker, though they vehemently differed on 
prescription, largely agreed on principle: preservation of the Union must 
be the paramount goal of not only the Civil War, but of the government 
at large. The 13th Amendment, of course, ultimately sealed the fate of 
emancipation. The Emancipation Proclamation, then, represented part of 
the “slow, firm progress toward a revolutionary goal” that had long been 
Lincoln’s modus operandi.21 
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 The Emancipation Proclamation stands as part of America’s 
enduring quest to become a more perfect Union. Certainly, it was a 
dramatic assertion of executive power, one that may even have 
transcended the formalist bounds of the Constitution, and it is also true 
that Lincoln’s legal argument defined no concrete limiting principle to 
constrain future exercises of war powers. The ultimate limiting 
principle, however, comes through the ongoing work of the people to 
form that more perfect union. As Lincoln argued, it is citizens who are 
the ultimate arbiters of what the Constitution means. Only the people 
can decide – as they did in 1776 – that the existing form of government 
is unacceptable, only the people can decide – as they did in 1787 – that 
Union is worth forming, and only the people can decide – as they did 
in 1861 – that such a Union is worth preserving. In executing that final 
decision, Lincoln determined that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
necessary. That such a decision had the consequence of bending 
America towards the liberty imbued in the Declaration of 
Independence is simply a testament to American virtue. Each great 
decision in American history has, to some extent, been a gamble. It is 
only through such gambles, though, that a nation conceived in and 
dedicated to liberty, committed to the principle of government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, has been able to long endure. 
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